

# Entrapping Nature

---

**Elham Kashefi**

*University of Edinburgh  
UK Networked Quantum Information Technologies Hub  
CNRS, Pierre and Marie Curie University  
Paris Centre for Quantum Computing*



# Profile of a Quantum Person

---

# Profile of a Quantum Person


---



Mathematics


# Profile of a Quantum Person

---




# Profile of a Quantum Person

---




# Profile of a Quantum Person

---




# Profile of a Quantum Person

---



# Profile of a Quantum Person

---





# Feynman Vision - 82

---

Quantum Computing as the technology for simulating quantum systems

# Feynman Vision - 82

---


Quantum Computing as the technology for simulating quantum systems

## **Spectacular Progress**

from complexity theory to cryptography  
from simulation to sampling  
from tomography to implementation  
from foundation to interpretation



# QSoft Vision of Quantum Technology

---





# QSoft Vision of Quantum Technology

---



# QSoft Vision of Quantum Technology

---



# Quantum Era

---

## *National Investments*

*Europe 1bn€  
UK 270M £  
Netherlands 80M \$  
China Billions !  
US, Singapore, Canada*


## **Quantum Machines**

## *Private Investments*

*Google, IBM, Intel, ATOS, Alibaba  
Big VC funds  
Startups Companies*

# Quantum Era

*National Investments*




*Private Investments*

*Google, IBM, Intel, ATOS, Alibaba  
Big VC funds  
Startups Companies*

# Quantum Era

National Investments




Private Investments

Google, IBM, Intel, ATOS, Alibaba  
Big VC funds  
Startups Companies



# Quantum Era

National Investments




Private Investments

Google, IBM, Intel, ATOS, Alibaba  
Big VC funds  
Startups Companies

# Quantum Era

National Investments

Moore's Law for Quantum Computers



**Target:** > 50 qubits Device

**Feature:** Not Simulatable Classically

**Problem:** Testing, Validation, BenchMarking, Certification, Verification ...


Private Investments

Google, IBM, Intel, ATOS, Alibaba  
Big VC funds  
Startups Companies

# Quantum Era

National Investments

Moore's Law for Quantum Computers



Private Investments

Google, IBM, Intel, ATOS, Alibaba  
Big VC funds  
Startups Companies

**Problem:** Testing, Validation, BenchMarking, Certification, Verification ...

**Can we BOOTSTRAP a smaller quantum device to test a bigger one?**

# Quantum Verification

---

Efficient verification methods for realistic quantum devices

# Quantum Verification

---

Efficient verification methods for realistic quantum devices

- Correctness of the outcome
- Operation monitoring
- Quantum property testing

# Quantum Verification

---

Efficient verification methods for realistic quantum devices

- Correctness of the outcome
- Operation monitoring
- Quantum property testing

- Architectural constraints
- Experimental imperfections

# Quantum Verification

---

Efficient verification methods for realistic quantum devices


- Correctness of the outcome
- Operation monitoring
- Quantum property testing

- Architectural constraints
- Experimental imperfections

Non-universal:  
D-Wave machine  
Quantum Simulator  
Current Q2020 architecture

# Quantum Verification

---





# What is Verification

---

# What is Verification

---

A mechanism that when witness is accepted the outcome is good

# What is Verification

---

A mechanism that when witness is accepted the outcome is good

A mechanism that when witness is accepted the outcome is **not bad**

# What is Verification

---

A mechanism that when witness is accepted the outcome is good

A mechanism that when witness is accepted the outcome is **not bad**

A mechanism that **probability** of witness is accepted and the outcome is **bad is bounded**

# What is Verification


---

A **mechanism** that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

# What is Verification

---


A **mechanism** that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded



# What is Verification

---


A **mechanism** that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded



# What is Verification

---

A **mechanism** that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded






# What is Verification


---

A **mechanism** that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded



# What is Verification


---



A mechanism that prob of **witness is acc and outcome is bad** is bounded

# What is Verification

---




A mechanism that prob of **witness is acc and outcome is bad** is bounded

$$P_{incorrect}^{\nu} := P_{\perp} \otimes |acc\rangle\langle acc|$$

# What is Verification

---




$$P_{incorrect}^{\nu} := P_{\perp} \otimes |acc\rangle\langle acc|$$

A mechanism that **prob** of witness is acc and outcome is bad **is bounded**

# What is Verification

---




$$P_{incorrect}^{\nu} := P_{\perp} \otimes |acc\rangle\langle acc|$$

A mechanism that **prob** of witness is acc and outcome is bad **is bounded**

$$\sum_{\nu} p(\nu) \text{Tr} (P_{incorrect}^{\nu} B(\nu)) \leq \epsilon$$

# What is the challenge

---




$$P_{incorrect}^\nu := P_\perp \otimes |acc\rangle\langle acc|$$

A mechanism that **prob** of witness is acc and outcome is bad **is bounded**

$$\sum_\nu p(\nu) \text{Tr} (P_{incorrect}^\nu B(\nu)) \leq \epsilon$$

# What is the challenge

---




$$P_{incorrect}^{\nu} := P_{\perp} \otimes |acc\rangle\langle acc|$$

A mechanism that **prob** of witness is acc and outcome is bad **is bounded**

$$\sum_{\nu} p(\nu) \text{Tr} (P_{incorrect}^{\nu} B(\nu)) \leq \epsilon$$

# What is the challenge

---



$$P_{incorrect}^\nu := P_\perp \otimes |acc\rangle\langle acc|$$

A mechanism that **prob** of witness is acc and outcome is bad **is bounded**

$$\sum_\nu p(\nu) \text{Tr} (P_{incorrect}^\nu B(\nu)) \leq \epsilon$$



# How to deal with deviation

---

$$\sum_{\nu} p(\nu) \operatorname{Tr} (P_{\text{incorrect}}^{\nu} B(\nu)) \leq \epsilon$$



# How to deal with deviation

---

$$\sum_{\nu} p(\nu) \operatorname{Tr} (P_{incorrect}^{\nu} B(\nu)) \leq \epsilon$$

$\Omega$

*Different toolkits / Different tasks / Different witness /  
Different properties / Different assumptions / .....*

# How to deal with deviation

---

$$\sum_{\nu} p(\nu) \operatorname{Tr} (P_{incorrect}^{\nu} B(\nu)) \leq \epsilon$$



*Different toolkits / Different tasks / Different witness /  
Different properties / Different assumptions / .....*

Hypothesis Test, Certification, Self Testing, Entanglement detection,  
Quantum signature, Proof System, Hardware Testing, Post-hoc verification,  
Randomised benchmarking, Authentication, Blind Verification

# Most General Deviation

---

$$\Omega_{Eve,system}$$

Quantum Hiding



# Most General Deviation

---

$\Omega_{Eve,system}$

Quantum Hiding

$\sigma_{testsubspace}$

# Most General Deviation

---

$\Omega_{Eve,system}$


Quantum Hiding

$\sigma_{testsubspace}$

**Practical Protocols with No assumptions whatsoever**

# Most General Deviation

---



**Practical Protocols with No assumptions whatsoever**

# Entrapping Nature

---

**Untrusted Quantum Theory**

**Falsifiable via**

**Trusted Quantum Measurement**





# Entrapping Nature

---

**Untrusted Relativistic Quantum Theory**

**Falsifiable via**

**Trusted Wave Packet**



# Global Directions on Verification

---

- 
- 
-

# Global Directions on Verification


---

via **Hiding** : Cloud-based    Crypto App    Distributed Network

.  
. .  
.

# Global Directions on Verification

via **Hiding** : Cloud-based    Crypto App    Distributed Network



# Global Directions on Verification

---

via **Hiding** : Cloud-based    Crypto App    Distributed Network



# Global Directions on Verification

---

via **Hiding** : Cloud-based    Crypto App    Distributed Network

.  
. .  
.

# Global Directions on Verification

---

via **Hiding** : Cloud-based    Crypto App    Distributed Network

via **Proof System** : Quantum Simulation

# Global Directions on Verification

---

via **Hiding** : Cloud-based    Crypto App    Distributed Network

via **Proof System** : Quantum Simulation

via **Hypothesis Testing** : Bench Marking    Quantum Supremacy



# Global Directions on Verification

---

via **Hiding** : Cloud-based    Crypto App    Distributed Network

- EPSRC    UK
- NRF    Singapore
- USAirforce
- EU QFlagship

via **Proof System** : Quantum Simulation

via **Hypothesis Testing** : Bench Marking    Quantum Supremacy

# Global Directions on Verification

---

via **Hiding** : Cloud-based    Crypto App    Distributed Network

- EPSRC    UK
- NRF    Singapore
- USAirforce
- EU QFlagship

via **Proof System** : Quantum Simulation

- Number Crunching
- Noise Handling
- Architecture Adaptation
- New Methods Development

via **Hypothesis Testing** : Bench Marking    Quantum Supremacy

# Verification Status

---

- 
- 
-

# Verification Status

---

- It exists
- It is expanding

Trust Worthy Quantum Information TyQi17 Paris

.  
. .  
.

# Verification Status

---

- It exists
- It is expanding

Trust Worthy Quantum Information TyQi17 Paris

- The overhead depends on the level of trust

Entanglement Measurements	Trusted	Semi-trusted (i.i.d.)	Untrusted
	Trusted	$O(N)$	$O(N^4 \log N)$
Untrusted	$O(N^4 \log N)$	$O(N^4 \log N)$	$O(N^{64})$

# Verification Status

---

- It exists
- It is expanding

arXiv:1709.06984

Verification of quantum computation:  
An overview of existing approaches

Alexandru Gheorghiu, Theodoros Kapourniotis, Elham Kashefi

Entanglement Measurements	Trusted	Semi-trusted (i.i.d.)	Untrusted
	Trusted	$O(N)$	$O(N^4 \log N)$
Untrusted	$O(N^4 \log N)$	$O(N^4 \log N)$	$O(N^{64})$

# Verification Challenge

---

- 
- 
-

# Verification Challenge

---

- uniform platform versus tailored made

**Standardisation** ??? Given the unknown nature of the emerging devices

- .
- .
- .



# Verification Challenge

---


- uniform platform versus tailored made

**Standardisation** ??? Given the unknown nature of the emerging devices

- Academic versus Industry's need

??? Objective improvements

# Quantum Era




**Do we need to wait till error correcting codes became feasible**

# Classical - Quantum Collaboration Landscape

---

**Efficient Certification**



**Enhanced-Security**

# Quantum Cryptography

---

Protocols for hybrid classical-quantum communication network

- Electronic voting
- Fingerprinting
- Digital currency
- Secure cloud
- Blockchain
- Secure multi-party computing

# Quantum Cryptography

---


Protocols for hybrid classical-quantum communication network

- Electronic voting
- Fingerprinting
- Digital currency
- Secure cloud
- Blockchain
- Secure multi-party computing

- Practical Security Analysis

# Quantum Cryptography

---



# Quantum Crypto Status

---

- 
- 
-

# Quantum Crypto Status

---

- It exists
- It is expanding

Quantum Cryptography QCrypt17 Cambridge

.  
. .  
.



# Quantum Crypto Status

---

- It exists
- It is expanding

Quantum Cryptography QCrypt17 Cambridge

- Quantum Protocols for Quantum Webs

- Q Fingerprinting
- Q Money
- Q Secure cloud
- Q Byzantine Agreement
- Q Secure multi-party computing

# Quantum Crypto Status

---

- It exists
- It is expanding

Quantum Cryptography QCrypt17 Cambridge

- Quantum Protocols for Quantum Webs

- Q Fingerprinting
- Q Money
- Q Secure cloud
- Q Byzantine Agreement
- Q Secure multi-party computing

They need few qubits .... works with noisy one too

# Quantum Crypto Challenge

---

# Quantum Crypto Challenge

---

How to exploit them for Classical Web ?

# Quantum Crypto Challenge

---

How to exploit them for Classical Web ?

- Academic versus Industry's need

Objective improvements

# Quantum Crypto Challenge

---

How to exploit them for Classical Web ?

- Academic versus Industry's need

Objective improvements

Performances / Cost / Added values


# Practical Classical SMPC

First large-scale practical experiment with SMPC to implement a secure auction 08

Recently: Efficient (low communication) computational SMPC

Computation represented by a series of additions and multiplications of elements in  $F_p$ .


easy  
Linear Verifiable Secret Sharing



needs few qubits


# The Edinburgh-Paris Team

---





# The Edinburgh-Paris Team



# Other collaborators

---

## Theory

Damian Markham (LIP6)

Joe Fitzsimons (SUTD)

Anna Pappa (UCL)

Anne Broadbent (Ottawa)

Vedran Dunjko (Innsbruck)

Anthony Leverrier (INREA)

Animesh Datta (Warwick)

Theodoros Kapourniotis (Warwick)

## Experiment

Stefanie Barz (Vienna, Oxford)

Philip Walther (Vienna)

Ian Walmsley (Oxford)

# Other collaborators

---

## Theory

Damian Markham (LIP6)

Joe Fitzsimons (SUTD)

Anna Pappa (UCL)

Anne Broadbent (Ottawa)

Vedran Dunjko (Innsbruck)

Anthony Leverrier (INREA)

Animesh Datta (Warwick)

Theodoros Kapourniotis (Warwick)

## Experiment

Stefanie Barz (Vienna, Oxford)

Philip Walther (Vienna)

Ian Walmsley (Oxford)



**EPSRC**

Engineering and Physical Sciences  
Research Council



**NOIT**




# A girl simple dream

---


# A girl simple dream




# Quantum Devices



# A girl simple dream



# A girl simple dream



Global Verifiable Secure Quantum Web